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Abstract:
This study is an attempt to contrast intentionality 
theory in English and Arabic. As such, it aims to show the 
differences and similarities in tackling this theory by both 
English and Arabic scholars (philosophers and linguists). 
It starts with a description of the theory in English. Then, 
it describes the theory in Arabic. It is hypothesized that 
there are both similarities and differences between English 
and Arabic concerning this theory. Moreover, Arabic 
supposedly precedes English in stating the importance of 
intention in deciding the meaning of the utterance.
It is concluded that both English and Arabic have their 
own philosophical and linguistic roots of intentionality 
theory. However, their treatments have some similarities 
and other differences. For instance, Arabic philosophers 
and linguists are earlier in their study of intentionality 
than the English scholars. Moreover, both have focus 
on the relationship between mind or mental states and 
intentionality. In addition, both relate the interpretation of 
the intended meaning to the role of two types of context: 
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situational and linguistic. However, English 
linguists deal with intentions in terms of 
speech act theory and the cooperative 
principle, whereas Arabic scholars are 
found to treat them in terms of wills.
1. Introduction
This study is an attempt to contrast 
intentionality theory in English and Arabic. 
As such, it aims to show the differences and 
similarities in tackling this theory by both 
English and Arabic scholars (philosophers 
and linguists). It starts with a description 
of the theory in English. Then, it describes 
the theory in Arabic. It is hypothesized that 
there are both similarities and differences 
between English and Arabic concerning 
this theory. Moreover, Arabic supposedly 
precedes English in stating the importance 
of intention in deciding the meaning of the 
utterance.
2.Intentionality in English
Intentionality theory in English is 
developed by both philosophers and 
linguists. Different theories have been 
suggested in English to treat the problem 
of intentionality in humans. Most theories 
of intention in English have been produced 
in the 19th and 20th centuries. Some of the 
important theories will be overviewed in 
this section.
2.1 Husserl’s Approach to 
Intentionality
Husserl’s theory of intentionality is based 
on his philosophy of mind. He is influenced 
by his teacher ‘Brentano’ who asserts the 
idea that our intentions are fundamental 
properties of our consciousness. The 
word ‘intend’ is derived from the Latin 
origin ‘intendere’ which means to ‘point to’ 
or ‘aim to’. An action, thus, is intentional 
when it is done with intention (with 
purposeful aim). Intentionality is explained 
in terms of relation: intention is a mental 
state or experience with a relation to 
extra-mental states in the outside or 
objective world. Thus, intentionality is 
based on internal-external relationship1. 
According to Husserl, intentionality is 
part of the mentalese, or the language of 
thought. This form of thinking language 
is conception-dependent. It is said to be 
innate and universal. Its domain is mind, 
although it may be differently reflected or 
realized in reality or the objective world2. 
Husserl’s theory is phenomenological in 
the sense that each act or action in the 
objective world has a conceptual feature 
or ‘content’ which is independent of what 
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the act is articulated in reality, and this is 
the feature that makes that act intentional3.
2.2 Millikan’s Approach to 
Intentionality 
Millikan’s approach is based on biology. 
In different publications, she affirms that 
intentionality is based on a biological 
function. Functions precedes intentions. 
To be intentional is to be able to represent 
objects mentally. Hence, ‘’Millikan argues 
that biological selection is a method 
of design, and that this design is the 
source of function, and this function is the 
source of Intentionality or content. Thus, 
Intentionality can be reduced to function’’4. 
In this respect, she distinguishes between 
what is selected and what is selected 
for. Thus, she disagrees with ‘deductive 
inferences’ in meaning. She thinks that 
to derive from past to infer future is 
something useless in causal explanation5. 
Millikan asserts that language and thought 
are activities of our biological organism. 
As such, she indicates that the function of 
reference in meaning is a biological one6. 
2.3 Dretske’s Approach to 
Intentionality 
Like other philosophers, Dretske thinks 
that intentionality is related to mental 
perception and representations. However, 
he affirms that intentions are things 
produced from a connective relation 
between objects and minds7. Thus, his 
theory of intentionality is something that 
relates speakers and hearers. Lehan 
states that
Dretske believes that we can have 
a visual experience of a station wagon 
without recognizing what it is that we are 
having an experience of; we can see a 
yellow station wagon without seeing that 
the thing in front of us is a station wagon. 
He argues that the fact that one can 
be mistaken about whether x is an F or 
not means that our perceptions cannot 
have propositional content because our 
perception can only be a representation 
after we have identified a particular object8.
Thus, for him, identification and not 
mere perception is the cause of intentional 
perception. 
2.4 Pragmatic Theories of 
Intentionality
This section is devoted to the discussion 
of theories of intentionality in pragmatics. 
The most influential theories are J. Searle’s 
and P. Grice’s theories.
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2.4.1 The Role of the Context of 
Situation
The focus on the role of context in the 
interpretation of the intended meaning 
of the speaker has been asserted by the 
London Circle linguists J. R. Firth and 
Malinowski in the 1920’s and the 1930’s. 
They canonicate that language does not 
involve representational facts or functions; 
rather it has some kind of doing an 
action. Such acts are induced from what 
is called ‘’ the context of situation’ which, 
for them, covers the wholes of life9. Thus, 
treatments of context in English linguistics 
seem to be historically late. The role of 
context in inferring the intentions of the 
speakers has been clearly developed and 
formulated by philosophers of language 
and pragmaticians in the 1960’s and 
the 1970’s. However, such attempts 
have been considered as completely full 
theories in spite of their being criticized in 
different ways.                 
2.4.2 Searle’s Theory of Intentionality 
Searle’s work on intentionality treats 
philosophy of  language as a branch of 
philosophy of mind. He  takes mental 
states as existing (mostly as we think 
they are) and wants to get a foundation 
that relates  the biological reality/capacity 
of the mind to the world and reality. “In 
general,  we can get at the content of an 
intention by asking,  ‘What is the agent 
trying to do?’ Well, what is he  trying to 
do when he makes a declaration? He is 
trying to cause something to be the case 
by  representing it as being the case”10.
According to Searle, ‘’intentional states 
represent objects and states of affairs in 
exactly the same sense that speech acts 
represent objects and states of affairs’’11. 
This is not to say that intentionality is 
essentially linguistic: on the contrary, 
‘’language is derived from intentionality, 
and not conversely’’12.
Searle’s main contribution to the 
philosophy of language and pragmatics 
has been his developments of Austin’s 
(1962) theory of speech acts. He attempts 
to synthesize his new ideas related to the 
analysis of “illocutionary acts”. His thesis 
invokes that such acts are constituted 
by the ‘’rules of language’’. Besides, 
he maintained that sentence meaning 
consists in sets of regulative rules requiring 
the speaker to perform the illocutionary act 
indicated by the sentence and that such 
acts involve the utterance of a sentence 
which (a) indicates that one performs 
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the act (illocution); (b) means what one 
says (locution); and (c) addresses an 
audience in the vicinity (perlocution). In 
his book Speech Acts, Searle sets out to 
combine all these elements to give his 
account of illocutionary acts. He develops 
a set of rules or ‘ felicity conditions’ 
that reflect the speaker’s intention in 
communication13. He proposes a model for 
deriving indirect meanings for utterances 
from their literal readings according to 
regular inferences, based on these felicity 
conditions. Such conditions are many 
including:
(1) an essential condition (whether 
a speaker intends that an utterance 
be acted upon by the addressee); 
(2) a sincerity condition (whether 
the speech act is being performed 
seriously and sincerely); 
(3) a preparatory condition(whether 
the authority of the speaker and the 
circumstances of the speech act are 
appropriate to its being performed 
successfully14.
Among the concepts presented by 
Searle is the distinction between the 
“illocutionary force” (speech act) and the 
“propositional content” of an ‘’utterance’’. 
According to Searle, the sentences...
1-Lydia writes hastily.
2-Does Lydia write hastily?
3-Lydia, write hastily!
4-Would that Lydia write hastily!
...each invokes the same propositional 
content (Lydia writes hastily) but 
differ in the illocutionary force implied 
(respectively, a statement, a question, a 
command and an expression of desire) 15. 
Moreover, Searle asserts the different 
levels of direct speech acts and indirect 
speech acts. Indirect speech acts encode 
the speaker’s indirect or real intentions. 
Applying a conception of such illocutionary 
acts according to which they are (roughly) 
acts of saying something with the intention 
of communicating with an audience, he 
describes indirect speech acts as follows: 
“In indirect speech acts the speaker 
communicates to the hearer more than 
he actually says by way of relying on their 
mutually shared background information, 
both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together 
with the general powers of rationality and 
inference on the part of the hearer.” An 
account of such act, it follows, will require 
such things as an analysis of mutually 
shared background information about the 
conversation, as well as of rationality and 
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linguistic conventions16. For example, a 
statement like: 
I am occupied tonight.
may be intended not only as an assertion 
but as an apology or polite refusal for not 
coming to a night party. 
2.4.3 Grice’s Theory of Intentionality
One of Grice’s most influential and 
prominent contributions to the study of 
language and communication is his theory 
of ‘’meaning’’. In his article ‘Meaning’, Grice 
highlights the difference between natural 
and non-natural meaning. Grice further 
extends his theory of meaning in his ‘Logic 
and Conversation’17. These two articles 
shed the light on ‘utterer’s meaning and 
intentions’ as well as ‘utterer’s meaning, 
sentence meaning, and word meaning’. It 
is the utterer’s (or addressor’s) meaning 
which is related to his pragmatic theory of 
intentionality18. 
His theory of meaning can be described 
as an intention-based semantics. In most 
of his writings, Grice deals exclusively 
with non-natural meaning. His overall 
approach to the study of non-natural 
meaning, formulated in his ‘intention-
based semantics’, because it attempts to 
explain non-natural meaning in terms of 
the notion of a speakers’ intentions. To 
do this, Grice distinguishes between two 
kinds of non-natural meaning:
a- Utterer’s Meaning: What a speaker 
means by an utterance. (Grice hasn’t 
introduced this term until ‘Logic and 
Conversation’. The more common term 
in contemporary pragmatics is ‘’speaker 
meaning’’.)
b- Timeless Meaning: The kind of 
meaning that can be possessed by a type 
of utterance, such as a word or a sentence. 
(This is mainly called ‘’conventional 
meaning’’.)
The two steps in intention-based 
semantics are
(1) to define utterer’s meaning in terms 
of speakers’ overt audience-directed 
intentions, and then 
(2) to define timeless meaning in terms 
of utterer’s meaning. The net effect is to 
define all linguistic notions of meaning 
in purely mental terms, and to thus shed 
psychological light on the semantic realm.
Grice presents the basic saying/
implicating distinction. According to him, 
what a speaker means by an utterance 
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can be divided into what the speaker 
‘says’ and what the speaker thereby 
‘implicate’. Saying as such is generally 
related to the surface or external meaning 
of the utterance. It is related to the 
propositional content of the wording. On 
the other hand, implicatures are related 
to the set of assumptions surrounding the 
utterance in a given context. In this regard, 
implicatures are decoded by listeners 
via their inferences of the speaker’s 
intention19. Implicatures are created due to 
the speaker’s intended violation or flouting 
of the maxims of the cooperative principles 
which are as follows:
1-The maxim of quantity: Be as 
informative as you possibly can, and give 
as much information as is needed, and no 
more.
2-The maxim of quality: Be truthful, and 
do not give information that is false or that 
is not supported by evidence.
3-The maxim of relation: Be relevant, 
and say things that are pertinent to the 
discussion.
4-The maxim of manner: Be as clear, 
as brief, and as orderly as one can in 
what you say, and avoid obscurity and 
ambiguity20. 
3. Intentionality Theory in Arabic
Intentionality and intention analysis 
have been presented in Arabic literature 
in both philosophy and linguistic studies. 
First, the theory will be introduced in the 
philosophical views.
3.1 Philosophical Views of 
Intentionality
Philosophical foundations of 
intentionality theory in Arabic are 
obscure and murky. However, there are 
some fundamentals of this theory in the 
Islamic philosophy. Such view are mainly 
presented by two prominent scholars Ibn 
Sīnā (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). 
Avicenna apparently links the 
concept of a meaning or maanaىنعم 
to the mind’s intention to signify some 
object in the external world. In this 
context, it is the extra-mental things or 
objects themselves that are primarily 
denominated as intentions, inasmuch as 
they are the referents of a deliberate act 
of signification by the mind. Still, things 
are only called intentions inasmuch 
as they are understood and signified 
linguistically—so intention is not simply 
synonymous with object. The fundamental 
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point here, then, is that we can label as 
an intention anything that functions as a 
significandum relative to either a mental 
or a linguistic sign. Avicenna believes in 
two types of existence: ‘internal or mental’ 
and ‘external or objective’. The objects 
of linguistic signification can be called 
intentions in either of these two modes of 
existence. His theory of intentionality is, 
thus, based on the fat that intentions are 
mental states or representations in the 
internal reality, directed to the external or 
objective reality21.
Avicenna indicates that intention ‘’is 
the selfsame nature or quiddity that is 
instantiated in both external and mental 
being. [On the other hand] Averroes (…)
builds his account of intentionality around 
the principle that x and the intention of 
x are two distinct things—as Averroes 
says, «the intention of colour is other than 
colour»’’22.Since the intention produced is 
indeed a new being or existent, it requires 
a subject for its existence, and that role 
is played by the relevant faculty in the 
cognizer (or, in the case of Averroes‘s 
doctrine of the unicity of the intellect, the 
separate material intellect)23.
Both Avicenna and Averroes think that 
abstractness is a necessary condition for 
intentionality to be present: the intentional 
existence of objects is always marked 
by some increase in their immateriality, 
however that dematerialization is 
produced.
3.2 Linguistic Views of Intentionality 
Arabic views on intentionality in 
language can be considered as a scattered 
theory. Arabic linguists or grammarians do 
not attempt to formalize a deep theory of 
intentionality. However, their views have 
been novel, original and important. 
3.2.1 Al-Jahidh’s View of Intentionality
Al-Jahidh is one of the famous scholars 
in Arabic, mainly rhetoric. He cites one 
of Bishr bin Al-Muatamir's important 
statements on communicative meaning: 
‘’the right thing in speech (al-maqãl لاقلما) 
is that it should be related to its context (al-
maqãm ماقلما or al-masãq 24››(قاسلما. Then, 
he scurries to assert that speakers should 
pay attention to the levels of context and 
the nature of listeners. As such, they 
have to select the way or style of speech 
according to such levels25. Here, it is clear 
that Arab rhetoricians are aware of the role 
of context and participants in interpreting 
the intended meaning of the message. 
Then,  Al-Jahidh cites a statement written 
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by Al-Itãbi: ››the real eloquent is the one 
who exposes his intentions without any 
hesitation, or repetition››26. Here,  Al-Itãbi 
sets what can be seen a type of cooperative 
principle which focuses on the maxims 
of quantity, quality and the like. Thus, 
speakers should not repeat themselves 
and be clear to other participants in 
communication. For such scholars, 
successful communication is based on the 
successful transference of intentions from 
speakers to listeners. Al-Jabiri states that 
Arabic semantic studies can be divided 
into two main trends: establishing the 
principles of the interpretation of speech 
and setting the conditions of successful 
speech and communication27. Thus, 
Arabic rhetoric can be seen as a classical 
version of modern pragmatics28.
3.2.2 Al-Jirjani’s View of Intentionality
Al-Jirjani establishes his theory of 
meaning which named ‘theory of systems’ 
مظنلا  ةيرظن . This theory is based on the 
unity of discourse at different levels: 
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic29. 
Thus, he affirms that we have two types of 
context: the linguistic context (neighboring 
words تارالجا) and context of situation (al-
maqam ماقلما). He adds that we say that an 
utterance is meaningful when it coheres 
with other words in the context and relates 
to its social context30. Consequently, the 
intended meaning is derived from such 
types of ‘systems’ which relate parts of 
communication to each other. As such, 
he focuses on language use rather than 
usage. 
This is evident in his statement that 
knowing the meaning of expressions is 
more important than the expressions 
themselves31. Moreover, he clarifies 
that every intended meaning is based 
on a previous mental or logical (pre)
supposition32. Besides, he asserts that 
speakers have to take their listeners into 
consideration and select his intended 
meanings according to his/her speakers33.
3.3 Iraqi Jurists’ Approach to 
Intentionality
It is rarely acknowledged that Iraqi 
religious jurists mainly in Najaf, Karbala and 
Hilla (Babylon) (such as Al-Iraqi, Al-Naini, 
Al-Hilli, Al-Khoie, Al-Sadr, …etc.) have 
developed the classical Arabic theories 
of meaning and communication in a way 
that can be seen as a complete theory or 
perspective. In this section, the focus will 
be on Al-Sadr›s interpretation of intentional 
meaning and levels of meaning. This is 
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done because he represents the most 
developed school in jurisprudence and he 
has discussed the ideas of all his teachers. 
Thus, he can be seen as a good source 
for summarizing his teachers› thoughts as 
well as his criticisms and additions. One 
of the important features of the jurist›s 
studies of the nature of language and 
meaning is that they talk about language 
in its general sense regardless of whether 
it is Arabic or whatsoever. Thus, their 
ideas can be generalized to any language 
on a large scale. Besides, their examples 
are not limited to religious texts only, but 
they include sentences from the ordinary 
variety of language. Moreover, their 
general theories of meaning are based on 
the nature of the human cognition. Al-Sadr 
indicates that the speakers intentions can 
be described as a series of wills (Irada ةدارإ 
). The meaning that is created in the mind 
of the listener according to his analysis 
or interpretation of such wills. Thus, he 
proposes three types of wills34:
a-The cognitive will (al-irãda al-
tasawuriya ةيروصتلا  ةدارلإا ): This intention is 
in fact referential in its orientation because 
the speaker here wants the listener to 
recognize his utterance as it is. The 
meaning which is derived from this will 
is the referential meaning (al-mãna al-
tasawuri يروصتلا  ىنعلما ). It is related to 
language usage.
b-The serious will (al-irãda  al-jiddiya 
ةيدلجا ةدارلإا ): This intention is connotative in 
its orientation. Here, the speaker seriously 
wants the listener to recognize his cognitive 
meaning. The meaning which is derived 
from this will is the elementary pragmatic/
intended meaning (al-mãna al-tasdĩqi al-
awwali يلولاا يقيدصتلا ىنعلما ).
c-The use-oriented will (al-irãda al-
istiamaliya ةيلامعتسلاا ةدارلإا): This intention is 
contextual in orientation since the speaker 
wants the listener to infer the real intended 
meaning from the context at hand. It is 
related to language use not usage. The 
meaning which is derived from this will is 
the real pragmatic meaning (يقيدصتلا ىنعلما 
يلامعتسلاا al-mãna al-tasdiqi al-istiamali).
Now, it is useful to give an example 
for these wills and their meanings: the 
sentence: ‘I am thirsty’ has the following 
wills:
a-The speaker (S) wants the hearer 
(H) to recognize that S is thirsty. It is not 
important for S that H will see it as true or 
false. (He may be joking). (Direct meaning)
b-S wants H to seriously believe that S 
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is thirsty. Here, the statement should be 
received as true by H. (Direct meaning)
c-S wants H to bring him/her water. 
Here, the statement is rendered to a 
request by S. This is his/her real intended 
meaning.(Indirect meaning)
It is important to mention that Al-
Sadr gives conditions for interpreting the 
intended meaning. He refers to context as 
‘al-qarinaةنيرقلا), and we have situational 
context (ةيلاح ةنيرق ) and linguistic context or 
co-text (ةيلاقم ةنيرق ). Such context will decide 
the intended meaning in any utterance or 
sentence35.
4. Contrast
The similarities and differences 
between English and Arabic intentionality 
theory can be summarized as follows:
1. Arabic philosophers preceded 
English philosophers in discussing the 
mental representations of intentionality. 
2. Arabic linguists and grammarians 
preceded English scholars in their 
reference to the role of context in the 
interpretation of intended meaning in 
language.
3. Both English and Arabic scholars 
present two major kinds of context: context 
of situation and Linguistic context or co-
text.
4. English scholars introduce two level 
of acts of meaning: direct and indirect. On 
the other hand, Arabic scholars present 
two direct levels (cognitive and serious) 
and a direct level.
5. English scholars discuss intentionality 
in terms of speech acts and co-operative 
principles, while Arabic scholars discuss it 
in terms of wills.
6. Arabic statements of intentionality 
in classical rhetoric have been scattered 
and unorganized. On the contrary, the 
beginnings of intentionality theory in 
English have been presented in a more 
technical or theoretical language.
7. English philosophical views on 
intentionality are deeper and more 
elaborated than the Arabic ones, though 
they are historically later.
8. Both Arabic  and English philosophers 
consider speaking and its intention as two 
different but related things.
Conclusions:
Both English and Arabic have their 
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own philosophical and linguistic roots 
of intentionality theory. However, their 
treatments have some similarities and 
other differences. For instance, Arabic 
philosophers and linguists are earlier in 
their study of intentionality that the English 
scholars. Moreover, both have focus on 
the relationship between mind or mental 
states and intentionality. In addition, both 
relate the interpretation of the intended 
meaning to the role of two types of context: 
situational and linguistic. However, English 
linguists deal with intentions in terms of 
speech act theory and the cooperative 
principle, whereas Arabic scholars have 
treated them in terms of wills. Also, both 
English and Arabic highlight the role of 
speaker’s and hearer’s knowledge and 
relationship in inferring the intended 
meaning of the message.
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